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INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone who lives in the Southwest, and they will tell you it has been
a dry year—but that may just be the way the Southwest is now. The
Southwest has been in a severe drought since 2000.1 2021 looks to be no
different. In fact, 2021 may usher in a whole new level of drought never
experienced before. 2 A sample of regional newspapers headlines include:
*
J.D., University of New Mexico, 2022; B.S. Wildlife Biology, University of Montana, 2016. Many
thanks to the editorial staff at the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law for all their hard work and to
Tanner for his constant support.
1.
Climate Change Indicators: A Closer Look: Temperature and Drought in the Southwest, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/southwest (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Climate
Change Indicators]; Henry Fountain, Southwest Drought Rivals Those of Centuries Ago, Thanks to
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/climate/droughtsouthwest-climate-change.html.
2.
Andrew Freedman & Hannah Dormido, Drought is the Sleeper Weather Story You’ll Hear
More
About
in
2021,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
7,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/01/07/drought-expands-north-america/?arc404=true;
Theresa Davis, NM Water Managers Warn Communities to Prepare for Low Rio Grande, ALBUQUERQUE
J. (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.abqjournal.com/2354734/nm-water-managers-warn-communities-toprepare-for-low-rio-grande.html; Contra Climate Prediction Center Internet Team, U.S. Seasonal
Drought
Outlook,
NAT’L
WEATHER
SERV.
CLIMATE
PREDICTION
CTR,
https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/sdo_summary.php (last visited Feb. 14,
2021) (stating that “[e]ntering into a climatologically wetter season for much of the west, coupled with
the development of La Niña conditions, increases chances for improving drought conditions.”)).
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“NM water managers warn communities to prepare for low Rio Grande”;
“Winter recovering in Southwest Colorado, but intense drought lingers”;
“Drought conditions expected to continue to worsen through spring months”;
and “Upper Colorado River drought plan triggered for first time.”3
There is no denying that climate change is here. Climate change is and
has been a well-accepted phenomenon in the scientific community for
decades.4 In fact, “a vast region of the western United States, extending from
California, Arizona and New Mexico north to Oregon and Idaho, is in the
grips of the first climate change-induced megadrought observed in the past
1,200 years.”5
Climate change is no longer a hypothetical future—western communities
experience unprecedented events related to wildfires and drought today.6 The
Southwest is warmer.7 There is less precipitation, which falls in different
places and at different times than it did historically.8
Communities are seeing their ways of life change completely due to
climate change. 9 Climate change prevents some indigenous communities
from being able to perform traditional ceremonies. 10 The looming water
crisis has the ability to limit development and certain activities in arid states
3.
Andrew Shipley, Drought Conditions Expected to Continue to Worsen Through Spring
Months, VALLEY CENT. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.valleycentral.com/weather/drought-conditionsexpected-to-continue-to-worsen-through-spring-months/; Davis, supra note 2; Luke Runyon, Upper
Colorado River Drought Plan Triggered for First Time, KUNC (Jan. 20. 2021),
https://www.kunc.org/environment/2021-01-20/upper-colorado-river-drought-plan-triggered-for-firsttime; Jim Mimiaga, Winter Recovering in Southwest Colorado, but Intense Drought Lingers, THE
JOURNAL (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.the-journal.com/articles/winter-recovering-in-southwest-coloradobut-intense-drought-lingers/; Luke Runyon, Upper Colorado River Drought Plan Triggered for First
Time, KUNC (Jan. 20. 2021), https://www.kunc.org/environment/2021-01-20/upper-colorado-riverdrought-plan-triggered-for-first-time.
4.
Do Scientists Agree on Climate Change?, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/faq/17/doscientists-agree-on-climate-change/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
5.
Becky Bollinger & Andrew Freedman, Historic Drought Deepens in the West as Window for
Rain,
Snow
Closes,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
3,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/03/03/drought-worsens-west/.
6.
Andrew Freedman & Darryl Fears, The Western U.S. is Locked in the Grips of the First
Human-caused
Megadrought,
Study
Finds,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/04/16/southwest-megadrought-climate-change/;
Fountain, supra note 1.
7.
Climate Change Indicators, supra note 1.
8.
CLIMAS, Climate Change in the Southwest, UNIV. ARIZ., https://climas.arizona.edu/swclimate/climate-change-southwest (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
9.
Lauren Paskus, Climate Report Details Deep Hits to the Southwest, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/climate-change-the-fourth-national-climate-assessmentdetails-deep-hits-to-the-southwest.
10. Anna V. Smith, Ongoing Fish Kill on the Klamath River is an “Absolute Worst-Case Scenario,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 27, 2021), https://www.hcn.org/issues/53.7/indigenous-affairs-fish-ongoingfish-kill-on-the-klamath-river-is-an-absolute-worst-case-scenario.
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like Arizona. 11 Farmers are altering their practices in response to the
changing climate. 12 Hurricanes and wildfires have destroyed communities
and will likely continue to do so, making return impossible for some
communities after such disasters.13 The impacts of climate change are being
felt now.
One resource is particularly impacted by climate change: water. Much
has been written about the relationship between water and climate change.14
It is hard to ignore this relationship for several reasons. First, dry rivers or
bathtub rings in low-level reservoirs are visually striking and difficult to
ignore. Second, communities in the United States have started to feel and
experience the impacts of climate change on their water resources.15
A notorious example of climate change’s impact on a community’s water
resources occurred in California during the 2015 drought. That was the first
year the State of California implemented mandatory water restrictions. 16
Those restrictions required California water agencies “to cut their output by
25 percent or face fines of up to $10,000 per month.”17 In an effort to reduce
use, water agencies asked homeowners to water their lawns and wash their
cars less. 18 Homeowners who failed to comply could be fined. 19
Additionally, large landscapes like golf courses and cemeteries had to stop
water use immediately.20

11. Sarah Tory, Rapid Growth in Arizona’s Suburbs Bets Against an Uncertain Water Supply,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (June 1, 2021), https://www.hcn.org/issues/53.6/south-water-rapid-growth-inarizonas-suburbs-bets-against-an-uncertain-water-supply.
12. Meera Subramanian, The Flash Drought Brought Misery, But Did it Change Minds on Climate
Change?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 17, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/climate-change-the-flashdrought-brought-misery-but-did-it-change-minds-on-climate-change.
13. Piper McDaniel, After the Camp Fire, Paradise is still home, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 6,
2020), https://www.hcn.org/articles/south-wildfire-after-the-camp-fire-paradise-is-still-home.
14. Michael Dettinger et al., Western Water and Climate Change, 25 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
2069, 2069 (2015); Kenneth D. Frederick & David C. Major, Climate Change and Water Resources, in
37 CLIMATE CHANGE 7, 7 (1997).
15. Dettinger et al., supra note 14, at 2078.
16. Darryl Fears, As Water Runs Dry, Californians Brace for a New Way of Life, WASH. POST
(Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-water-runs-dry-californiansbrace-for-a-new-way-of-life/2015/04/04/f1ebb4ba-daba-11e4-b3f2-607bd612aeac_story.html.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; Darryl Fears, Calif. Governor Orders Statewide Mandatory Water Restrictions, WASH.
POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/calif-governor-ordersstatewide-mandatory-water-restrictions/2015/04/01/3495867a-d89e-11e4-8103fa84725dbf9d_story.html.

184

VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 23

It was clear during the 2015 California drought that surface water was
either unavailable or available in much lower amounts than usual.21 Surface
water includes all above-ground water sources like in rivers, lakes, and
oceans. 22 It is common during droughts and climatic events to focus on
surface water because it is the most visible resource.23 Therefore, most of the
discussions in the United States regarding climate change and water relate to
surface water.24
However, there is another water source impacted by climate change that
does not receive comparable attention: groundwater. Groundwater is also of
particular significance for the United States because it “constitutes about
22% of the nation’s fresh water supply” and “about one-half of the population
of the United States relies on groundwater as its primary source of drinking
water.”25 But because groundwater is underground, as the saying goes, it is
often out of sight and out of mind. However, in times of drought and crisis,
groundwater is the resource that everyone relies upon.26
Most legal research and analysis in the United States focuses on surface
water.27 There has been less of a focus on groundwater.28 Recent progress in
legal research and analysis has focused on new groundwater laws or climate
change adaptations.29
Conjunctive management, or the “coordinated use of surface water and
groundwater,” is one of the best paths forward to deal with climate change.30
21. See Zoe Meyers, Millions in Debt, a Community Wonders if its Water Source will Provide,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS: WORTH OF WATER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.hcn.org/articles/worth-of-watermountain-house-drought-california-debt (showing how the California drought in 2015 has diminished
irrigation from surface water and how that has impacted residents).
22. Surface Water, USGS DICTIONARY OF WATER TERMS, https://www.usgs.gov/specialtopic/water-science-school/science/dictionary-water-terms?qt-science_center_objects=0#qtscience_center_objects (last visited Nov. 11, 2021) (Definition of surface water).
23. Drought and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
24. See Generally BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LITERATURE SYNTHESIS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES (3rd ed. 2013) (suggesting that surface
water is discussed more than other types of water regarding climate change).
25. Id.
26. ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES §4:4 (2020 ed.).
27. Robin Kundis Craig, Water Law and Climate Change in the United States: A Review of the
Scholarship (Jan. 2, 2020) (research paper No. 357, available on the Utah Law Digital Commons),
https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/186/.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Conjunctive
Use,
WATER
EDUC.
FOUND.,
https://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/conjunctive-use (last visited Nov. 9, 2021); See Brian E.
Gray, Global Climate Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management Opportunities, 14 HASTINGS
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However, there has been little focus on the “traditional groundwater legal
regimes as a climate change issue.”31
This paper explores how climate change and the current groundwater
legal regimes interact in Colorado’s San Luis Valley (Valley). The Valley
was chosen as a case study because it is an example of a community that
introduced voluntary measures to address the overuse of groundwater. This
paper examines how those measures might have been sufficient if not for the
additional challenge of climate change.
This paper will first explain the history of water management in the
Valley. This paper will then provide a brief overview of groundwater
hydrology and groundwater law in Colorado. Next, it will explain how
voluntary water management developed in the Valley. Then, the paper will
analyze why the voluntary water management system is not adequate in light
of climate change and argue that the time for binding enforcement measures
is now. The paper concludes that, without institutional accountability,
groundwater law and management practices will continue to struggle with
climate change.
A. Historical Context for San Luis Valley Voluntary Measures
The Valley is located in Southern Colorado, extending briefly into
Northern New Mexico. It is a valley surrounded by mountains, the San Juan
to the west and the Sangre de Cristo range to the east. It is an area in which
the primary economic income is derived from farming.32 The main crops are
potatoes, barley, and alfalfa; all water intensive crops.33 The valley has been
consumed by a never-ending water saga.
The Valley does not receive much, if any, rainfall. It only receives about
seven inches of rain per year on average.34 So, where does the water that
W.-N.W. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 1453, 1457 (2008) (explaining the impacts of climate change on the water
supply and recommendations to mitigate those impacts); See generally, Justice Gregory J. Hobbs,
Jr., Protecting Prior Appropriation Water Rights Through Integrating Tributary Groundwater:
Colorado’s Experience, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 5, 11 (2010) (explaining conjunctive management and
Colorado water law).; John Hedges, Currents in California Water Law: The Push to Integrate
Groundwater and Surface Water Management Through the Courts, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 375,
382 (2011).
31. Craig, supra note 27.
32. Carly Carswell, Farmers Agree to Tax Those Who Deplete Groundwater, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.hcn.org/issues/45.3/conservative-farmers-agree-to-tax-those-whodeplete-groundwater.
33. Id.
34. Paige Blankenbuehler, After Years of Drought and Overuse, the San Luis Valley Aquifer
Refills, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 26, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/after-years-of-drought-andoveruse-a-water-basin-refills-in-the-san-luis-valley.
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sustains the agricultural economy come from? Two places: (1) the Rio
Grande River running through the Valley and (2) the two large aquifers that
sit beneath the Valley.35
Water issues in the Valley originate from the compact delivery
obligations placed upon the Rio Grande. Under the Rio Grande Compact and
an international treaty with Mexico, Colorado must send a certain amount of
water downstream to New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.36 The water delivery
requirement is legally binding and, therefore, enforceable upon violation.37
Colorado first violated these delivery obligations when a drought struck the
Valley in the 1950s.38 This drought led to a rise in groundwater pumping
which took water away from the Rio Grande.39
After years of under-deliveries, Texas and New Mexico finally sued
Colorado in 1966 for an “accumulated underdelivery of 944,000 acre-feet.”40
To comply with these delivery obligations, Colorado shut down or greatly
restricted Rio Grande (i.e., surface water) users.41 However, during this same
time, well (i.e., groundwater) users faced no restrictions and continued
pumping.42 The differences in treatment between surface and groundwater
users lead to litigation.43 Many users fell into both categories because farmers
in the Valley historically used wells to supplement their surface water
supplies.44
In the 1970s, Colorado coordinated with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
to develop the Closed Basin Project (CBP) to allocate water fairly between
users. 45 The Closed Basin is a part of the Valley that is unconnected
hydrologically to the Rio Grande.46 There, water that flows into the Closed

35. Helen Smith, San Luis Valley Water: Beneath the Surface, ALAMOSA NEWS (May 17,
2017), https://alamosanews.com/article/san-luis-valley-water-beneath-the-surface.
36. Rio Grande Compact, N.M.S.A. § 72-15-23 Art. II-III (1978).
37. NICOLE T. CARTER ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45430, SHARING THE COLORADO RIVER AND
THE RIO GRANDE: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT WITH MEXICO 5 (2018).
38. Kathleen A. Miller et. al., Groundwater Rights in an Uncertain Environment: Theoretical
Perspectives on the San Luis Valley, 33 NAT. RES. J. 727, 748 (1993).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Carswell, supra note 32.
42. Id.
43. Carswell, supra note 32; G.E. RADOSEVICH & R.W. RUTZ, SAN LUIS VALLEY WATER
PROBLEMS: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, COLO. WATER RES. RSCH. INST. 25–29 (1979).
44. See William A. Paddock, Implementation of Integrated Surface and Groundwater
Administration Under the 1969 Act in the Rio Grande Basin, Water Division No. 3, 22 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 247, 266 (2019) (explaining how the moratorium on issuing well permits impacted users
depending on both confined and unconfined aquifers).
45. Carswell, supra note 32.
46. Paddock, supra note 44, at 250.
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Basin does not enter the Rio Grande.47 That is, inter alia, a reason why the
Closed Basin water is excluded from the waters of the Rio Grande
Compact. 48 The “lowest part of the Closed Basin is known . . . as the
‘sump.’”49 The sump is an area where water pools and collects.50 “There is
no drainage from the basin and much of the water that flows into it is lost
through evapotranspiration.”51
The CBP was an attempt to take advantage of this unused water and
satisfy multiple stakeholders at once. The CBP works by using wells to pump
and drain water out of the Closed Basin area.52 Then the “[w]ater salvaged
from the . . . area is to be delivered to the Rio Grande River to help meet
Colorado’s obligations to New Mexico and Texas under the Rio Grande
Compact.”53
The reasoning behind the CBP was that by tapping into a previously
inaccessible water source for compact deliveries, compact delivery
obligations could be satisfied and well pumping would not have to stop.54
Thus, well users through the Valley could keep pumping because the
compact deliveries would be satisfied by another source of water.55
Unfortunately, the CBP never lived up to its promise. In the 1980s and
1990s it worked fairly well because there was plenty of precipitation and,
therefore, multiple wet years.56 Because of the ample precipitation, there was
both enough water for well users to pump and enough surface water to meet
delivery obligations.57 However, the Closed Basin Project underdelivered.58
This became a problem when drought struck the Valley in the early 2000s.59
Because the Project always underdelivered, Colorado could no longer
meet its delivery obligations when drought arrived.60 As a result, there was
not enough water available for both well users and surface water users to
47. Id. at 269–70; Carswell, supra note 32 (stating “streams don’t drain to the Rio Grande.”).
48. Id. at 252.
49. PHILIP A. EMERY, HYDROGEOLOGY OF THE SAN LUIS VALLEY, COLORADO – AN OVERVIEW
AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 1 (1996).
50. See generally Paddock, supra note 44, at 251 (describing the sump in the Rio Grande Basin).
51. Wm. Joe Simonds, The San Luis Valley Project, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (last updated
Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.usbr.gov/history/sanluisv.html.
52. Paddock, supra note 44, at 250-51.
53. Closed Basin Landowners Ass’n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734 P.2d 627, 629
(Colo. 1987).
54. Paddock, supra note 44, at 280-281; Carswell, supra note 32 (“The Closed Basin Project
seemed like a win-win: Wells kept pumping, river irrigators got water, and regulators backed off.”).
55. Paddock, supra note 44, at 274.
56. Carswell, supra note 32.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Carswell, supra note 32; Paddock, supra note 44, at 295.
60. Carswell, supra note 32.
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sustain use as before the drought struck.61 This led Colorado to cut off surface
water users again while no limits were imposed on well users.62 Old fights
rose anew. The modern-day struggles of water management in the Valley had
begun—and they have not stopped since.
I. PART I
Groundwater hydrology and groundwater law will help people
understand the Valley’s issues. To that end, this section first discusses the
hydrologic relationship between surface water and groundwater. It then
provides a brief historical overview of the development of groundwater law
in Colorado, before moving onto legal structures unique to the Valley.
The scientific definition of groundwater is water that “exists in saturated
soils beneath the earth’s surface and in aquifers.” 63 Groundwater can be
either a finite or a renewable source depending on where it is located.64
The Valley has surface water and groundwater stored in aquifers. 65
“Aquifers are shallow and deep geologic formations” which store water
underground. 66 They can either be confined or unconfined. 67 Water in a
confined aquifer is trapped and cannot easily leave the aquifer.68 This, in turn,
creates constant pressure on the confined aquifer.69
In contrast, an unconfined aquifer moves around easier, and the water
table rises and falls subject to atmospheric pressure.70 Unconfined aquifers
“are usually closer to the Earth’s surface than confined aquifers are, and as
such are impacted by drought conditions sooner than confined aquifers.”71

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 26, at 179.
64. Id. at 180. Typically, an aquifer can be considered to be a renewable resource if it has a high
rate of recharge and is sustainably managed. A high rate of recharge means there is a large amount of
water entering the aquifer. To sustainably manage an aquifer, managers must not take out more water than
goes into the aquifer on average. “Pumping that exceeds a safe or sustained yield is mining” and turns an
aquifer into a non-renewable resource. Then, an aquifer does not have water coming in to replace how
quickly the water is being removed. Id. at §4:5.
65. EMERY, supra note 49, at 3.
66. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 26, at 179.
67. Id.
68. What is the Difference Between a Confined and Unconfined (Water-Table) Aquifer?, USGS,
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-difference-between-confined-and-unconfined-water-tableaquifer#:~:text=A%20confined%20aquifer%20is%20an,the%20top%20of%20the%20aquifer
(last
visited Jan. 29, 2022).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.(stating that water in unconfined aquifers is able to “rise and fall.”).
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The Valley has both an unconfined and a confined aquifer. 72 The
unconfined aquifer sits on top of the confined aquifer.73 Generally, the two
different aquifers exchange some water.74 However, the unconfined aquifer
interacts closer with surface water uses than the confined aquifer does.75
Confined aquifers are valuable because they are under constant pressure.
Due to this pressure, when “the aquifer is first tapped . . . the cost of extraction
is low.” 76 Confined aquifers are “classified as artesian” sources. 77 This
classification as artesian made a difference because historically
“groundwater was subdivided into three major arbitrary and unscientific
categories: artesian, percolating, and underground watercourses.” 78 While
groundwater laws in the United States have evolved over time, these
classifications can still make a difference in how a particular type of
groundwater is managed.
When water laws were developing, states, scientists, and lawyers did not
have the technical understanding of groundwater that they do today. 79
Initially, it was thought that groundwater and surface water were two
separate, distinct systems.80 However, it is well known now that groundwater
and surface water can be intimately related and are often the same system.81
Actions that affect groundwater also affect surface water and vice versa. For
example, “[p]umping and withdrawal of groundwater supplies often
diminishes surface water supplies, causing it to percolate in aquifers, while
diversion of surface water often leads to depletion of groundwater
supplies.” 82 Conversely, “surface water levels may increase when
groundwater use is restricted.”83
Unfortunately, this historical misunderstanding of the relationship
between surface water and groundwater resulted in the development of a
complicated groundwater management system. The initial belief that surface

72. EMERY, supra note 49, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 26, at 179.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ruopu Li et al., Evaluating Hydrologically Connected Surface Water and Groundwater Using
a Groundwater Model, 52 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 799, 799 (2016).
82. Allison Evans, The Groundwater/Surface Water Dilemma in Arizona: A Look Back and a Look
Ahead Toward Conjunctive Management Reform, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 269, 273 (2010).
83. Id.
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and groundwater were two separate systems led many states to manage them
under two distinct legal regimes as separate resources.84
Historically, Colorado treated groundwater and surface water as two
different resources.85 Thus, initial efforts to comply with delivery obligations
in the Valley resulted in a limitation on surface water users exclusively.86
Starting in the 1940s, “the amount of ground water appropriation
dramatically increased” and “[c]onflicts between surface water users and
ground water users became common.”87 Colorado started to see changes in
surface flows due to poorly regulated groundwater pumping.88 Change came
in the 1960s when Colorado began to integrate surface and groundwater
management.89
Colorado recognized that surface water use and groundwater use were
connected. To maximize water usage and satisfy both surface and
groundwater users, Colorado enacted the 1965 Groundwater Management
Act (1965 Act). 90 This 1965 Act “was intended to bring groundwater into
surface water rule.”91
The surface water rule was that of prior appropriation. 92 Under prior
appropriation, priority is given to “uses that are first in time.”93 This means
that in times of scarcity, senior users are prioritized ahead of junior users.94
This “doctrine is prevalent in the western United States” and when related to
groundwater, “is the only doctrine . . . that does not necessarily relate water
rights to ownership of the land overlying the groundwater.”95
By recognizing that surface and groundwaters were connected,
Colorado began to conjunctively manage its water resources. “‘Conjunctive
use’ is the coordinated appropriation of ground and surface waters that are
hydrologically connected.”96 This means that the same law is applied to both
84. LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE – PRESERVATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY § 9:2 (2020 ed.).
85. See Hobbs, J., supra note 30, at 12 (explaining that the Colorado Doctrine first recognized both
surface and groundwater as a public resource).
86. Id.
87. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 27 (Colo. 2006).
88. See RAST ET AL., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT – CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SURFACE AND
GROUNDWATER IN THE RIO GRANDE BASIN 12 (2010).
89. Gallegos, 147 P.3d at 27–28.
90. Ari J. Stiller-Shulman, No Seat at the Water Table: Colorado's New Groundwater Basin
Statute Leaves Senior Surface Rights in the Lurch, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 819, 830 (2013).
91. RAST ET AL., supra note 88, at 12.
92. Stiller-Shulman, supra note 90, at 828.
93. LINDA A. MALONE, ENV’T. REGUL. OF LAND USE § 9:2 (2020 ed.).
94. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra 26, at § 5:32.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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surface and groundwater, usually in recognition of how closely connected the
two types of waters are.97 Conjunctive use is recognized as one of the better
approaches for managing water. 98 The 1965 Act created the Colorado
Groundwater Commission, which had the authority to regulate groundwater
pumping through the issuance of permits and by designating “basins where
groundwater would not injure surface rights.”99
Colorado groundwater management was further refined with the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (1969 Act). The 1969
Act essentially codified prior appropriation as the system of allocation for
groundwater.100 Significantly for the Valley, “well pumping came under the
existing priority system, but junior rights would not be curtailed unless they
caused definable injury to senior water rights.”101 Junior well users managed
to squeak by and continue to pump through the use of temporary
augmentation plans (aug plans).102 Under an aug plan, well users balance
what they extract by increasing supplies for senior-right holders in other
ways.103
However, in the infamous South Platte litigation, the Colorado Supreme
Court revoked the State engineer’s authority to allow these temporary
plans. 104 This meant well owners had to come up with permanent plans.
Unfortunately, permanent aug plans are hard to create and get approved. To
do so takes a lot of time and money, resources that most users cannot
afford.105 The threat of these permanent plans, combined with the drought
that began in 2000, scared the Valley’s groundwater users.106 As a result, the
groundwater users began to think of ways they could avoid having their water
shut off.107
The Valley was able to consider alternative ways to solve their water
crisis under the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Convention. 108
Colorado is legally obligated to deliver a certain amount of Rio Grande water
97. Id.
98. Gray, supra note 30; Hedges, supra note 30; Hobbs, J., supra note 30 (discussing water
management practices and climate change).
99. Stiller-Shulman, supra note 90, at 830-831.
100. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 27 (Colo. 2006).
101. RAST ET AL., supra note 88, at 12.
102. See Carswell, supra note 32 (explaining that well owners used annual plans to continue
pumping water).
103. Id.
104. Empire Lodge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Moyer, 39 P. 3d 1139, 1152 (Colo. 2001).
105. Carswell, supra note 32.
106. Id.
107. E.g. id. (describing proposals made by groundwater users to improve the aug plan system).
108. Id.
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to Texas, New Mexico, and Mexico.109 This obligation is Colorado’s primary
concern in its management of the Valley water resources and what motivated
the State’s previous enforcement of groundwater delivery.110
This is different than other parts of Colorado. Usually, “Colorado water
law requires water right owners to take an active role in protecting their rights
against possible injury.”111 Today, much of the work to prevent injury is done
by user-to-user compliance.112 This self-policing means users monitor one
another for overuse and sue one another when they think there has been a
violation.113
However, Colorado is primarily concerned with Compact delivery
obligations in the Valley.114 If users came up with a solution of their own and
still satisfied Compact deliveries, the State would likely let the Valley
manage its own water resources.
But the water resources outlook in the Valley has changed yet again. It
is entering another year of drought, a drought that shows no signs of letting
up. 115 In the next section, this paper argues that due to climate change,
Colorado must step in and manage water in the Valley. The self-imposed,
voluntary measures have not done enough to conserve water in the aquifer,
nor will they, due to climate change.
II. PART II
The first part of this section will go through the history and evolution of
self-governance in the Valley. Legislation provided users in the Valley with
three options: develop an aug plan, create fallow fields, or join a Subdistrict.
The focus will be primarily on that legislation and the development of
Subdistricts. The second part of this section will discuss why these measures
have not been effective in managing groundwater. The primary reason being
that economics and behavior do not incentivize conserving groundwater.

109. Supra Introduction, § A. Historical Context for San Luis Valley Voluntary Measures.
110. Id.
111. Miller et al., supra note 38, at 750.
112. Eds. note: Author’s assertion
113. Eds. note: Author’s assertion
114. Kelsey C. Cody et al., Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons: Irrigators
in the San Luis Valley of Colorado, 28:4 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 405, 407 (2015); RADOSEVICH & RUTZ,
supra note 43, at 3–5.
115. See Carswell, supra note 32 (discussing the Rio Grande Basin’s record-setting drought).
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A. Evolution and History of Water Self-governance in the Valley
In the early 2000s, drought struck all of Colorado.116 Groundwater users
across the State faced a reckoning. How could they reconcile their usage with
the diminishing supplies available? In several regions, the State had to step
in and limit usage.117 And that was precisely what the Valley was afraid of.
Rather than have the State step in and tell them what to do, farmers in the
Valley thought to try and save their lives and community before someone
else stepped in who would not.118 To that end, users in the Valley pushed
through legislation, developed strategies to conserve the aquifer, and even
managed to restore some of the aquifer.119
The first step the Valley took in trying to deal with its water management
issues was through the creation of a bill. In 2004, the Colorado General
Assembly enacted Senate Bill 04-222 (SB 04-222).120 SB 04-222 amended
the 1969 Act by adding a new section that is only applicable to the “use of
‘underground water’” in the Valley.121 This legislation was unique in that it
allowed a “form of self-regulation not available in other parts of the state.”122
This speaks to, and perpetuates, the difference in how Colorado allows the
Valley to manage its water.
There were two significant parts to SB 04-222. First, it “directed the state
to finally develop well regulations for the [V]alley.”123 In 2004, the Colorado
State Engineer promulgated new rules governing the new groundwater uses
in the Valley.124 The rules were promptly challenged but subsequently upheld
by the Colorado Supreme Court.125
Second, SB 04-222 recognized that the goal was no longer maximum
utilization of water; instead, the goal was to sustainably manage groundwater

116. Bradley Udall & Jonathan Overpeck, The Twenty-First Century Colo. River Hot Drought and
Implications for the Future, Water Res. Rsch., Mar. 24, 2017, at 2404.
117. Carswell, supra note 32.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Paddock, supra note 44, at 295.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 296.
123. Carswell, supra note 32.
124. There were nine new rules. “Rule 1 is the title, Rules 2 states the authority for the rules, and
Rule 3 explains the scope and purpose of the rules… Rule 4 contains the definition of terms used in the
New Use Rules… Rule 5 contains the principles and findings upon which the New Use Rules are
based. Rule 5 summarizes the legal and factual standards the state engineer must apply when promulgating
the rules…. Rule 6 is…the requirements for new withdrawals of groundwater affecting the Confined
Aquifer System.” Paddock, supra note 44, at 297–300.
125. Id. at 300–01.
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long term.126 To do this SB 04-222 “authorized sub-districts to charge for
pumping and create court-approved groundwater management plans and
state-endorsed annual plans to bolster rivers.”127
SB 04-222 left citizens of the Valley with three options: “participate in a
district, fallow their fields or work with water engineers to develop their own
augmentation plans, which in turn need to be approved by state water
courts.”128
The idea of subdistricts came from citizens of the Valley itself.129 The
idea was that these subdistricts would be divided and set up by geography,
so they would group those who already worked and lived together into a
formal organization. 130 This would allow these subdistricts to make hard
decisions internally.
These subdistricts would charge for pumped water and use that money
to pay to fallow fields. Additionally, “[c]omputer models would determine
the collective impact of each sub-district's wells to figure out how much the
group needed to trim its pumping to rebuild the aquifer.”131
In 2006, the rubber started to hit the road and Subdistrict 1 was created.132
“Subdistrict 1 contains some 174,000 acres of irrigated farmland and
approximately 3,000 irrigation wells, some 300 of which withdraw water
from the confined aquifer system, and the balance of which withdraw water
from the unconfined aquifer.”133 The board of managers of Subdistrict 1 were
tasked with developing a water management plan.134
The goal of that water management plan was to restore water levels and
“maintain a sustainable irrigation water supply in the [u]nconfined [a]quifer.”
135
The plan provided an alternative to state-imposed water management
regulations that would limit the use of irrigation wells within Subdistrict 1.136
Instead, the water management plan used “a system of self-regulation based
on economic incentives to promote responsible irrigation water use and
management.”137

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 296.
Carswell, supra note 32.
Blankenbuehler, supra note 34.
Carswell, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Paddock, supra note 44, at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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There were multiple objections filed after publication of the initial water
management plan.138 After a series of lawsuits and amendments, an amended
plan was created. 139 The amended plan gave Subdistrict 1 until 2031 to
“restore the aquifer” and required the creation of annual replacement plans.140
The amended plan was upheld in 2011 and the State Engineer approved
Subdistrict 1’s first annual replacement plan in 2012.141
The annual replacement plan was challenged as well and went all the
way to the Colorado Supreme Court, where it was upheld.142 “Subdistrict No.
1 has submitted an [annual replacement plan] and received state engineer
approval thereof every year since 2012; none of which have been
opposed.”143
Unfortunately, under its water management plan Subdistrict 1 lacks
enforcement authority. For example, it cannot require water cutbacks. 144
Furthermore, nowhere in SB 04-222 were water cutbacks statutorily
required.145 This meant Subdistrict 1 had “minimal tools besides higher taxes
to restrain pumping or manage competition between members.”146 This lack
of enforcement power is crucial because, as will be explained below, without
enforcement power the Valley has not been able to conserve enough water.
The Valley has learned some lessons. There are now six subdistricts in
the Valley, five new ones and the original Subdistrict 1. 147 All of these
subdistricts can charge pumping fees, use that money to pay farmers to fallow
fields, and pay farmers for general reductions in water use.148
There are a couple of significant differences between Subdistrict 1 and
these newer subdistricts. First, the newer subdistricts can require water

138. Id. at 310.
139. Id. at 310–11.
140. Caitlin Coleman, Hundreds of San Luis Valley Farm Wells at Risk as State Shortens Deadline
to Repair the Rio Grande River, WATER EDUCATION COLO. (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.watereducationcolorado.org/fresh-water-news/hundreds-of-san-luis-valley-farm-wells-atrisk-as-state-shortens-deadline-to-repair-rio-grande-river/ [hereinafter Hundreds of Farm Wells at Risk];
see Paddock, supra note 44, at 316 (explaining that the first ARP was submitted to the state engineer in
April 2012 and interested parties were given notice and opportunity to object the ARP).
141. Paddock, supra note 44, at 311–16.
142. Id. at 316–21.
143. Id. at 321.
144. Nick Bowlin, Colorado Farmers Fight to Save Their Water and Their Community’s Future,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.hcn.org/issues/51.16/water-colorado-farmers-fightto-save-their-water-and-their-communitys-future.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Blankenbuehler, supra note 34; The new subdistricts are “Conejos, Alamosa-La Jara, Rio
Grande, San Luis, and Saguache Creek Response Areas.” Paddock, supra note 44, at 332.
148. Carswell, supra note 32.
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restrictions.149 On the other hand, these newer subdistricts are based on an
‘opt-in’ approach where irrigation groundwater users within a response area
elect to be included in the sub-district. 150 This results in a checkerboard
subdistrict that includes parcels of land that may not be contiguous.151 It is
worth noting that some users in the Valley will never be part of a subdistrict
because they are geographically outside the boundaries of the subdistricts or
because they are a municipality or on federal land.152
For a while, the subdistrict initiatives worked. In 2012, the aquifer levels
in the Valley were rebounding.153 “Water users in sub-district 1 pumped onethird less water . . . Area farmers have fallowed 10,000 acres . . . Since a low
point in 2013, the aquifer . . . recovered nearly 250,000 acre-feet of water.”154
It appeared the aquifer would keep recovering. Then a dry spell in 2018
wiped out any gains.155 The aquifer dropped “about 800,000 acre-feet below
the . . . legally mandated recovery level.”156 The next section will explore
why the subdistrict’s voluntary measures, particularly those of Subdistrict 1,
are not sufficient in the context of climate change.
B. Analysis of Self-governance Measures
In an attempt to conserve their communal resource, groundwater users in
the Valley supported legislation that provided users in the Valley with three
options.157 Users could “participate in a district, fallow their fields or work
with water engineers to develop their own augmentation plans.” 158 These
districts in turn could adopt rules that would increase the cost to pump water,
pay farmers to fallow fields, or use other tools they developed.159
Ultimately, due to climate change, these initiatives have not been enough
to conserve groundwater in the Valley. Climate change and the prolonged

149. Bowlin, supra note 144.
150. Id.
151. Paddock, supra note 44, at 333.
152. Id. at 334.
153. Blankenbuehler, supra note 34.
154. Id.
155. Bowlin, supra note 144.
156. Id.
157. Blankenbuehler, supra note 34.
158. Id.
159. Bowlin, supra note 144 (“Subdistrict 1 has several tools at hand to curb pumping. The primary
one is a fee on pumped water, . . . There is also a program that pays farmers to take land out of
production”); Enhancing and Protecting the Water Rights of the Citizens of the San Luis Valley who
Reside Within the Boundaries of the District, RIO GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DIST.,
https://www.rgwcd.org/sd-1-conservation-page (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
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drought have put the Valley on the edge of a tragedy of the commons. The
economics and behavior of water usage do not incentivize conserving water.
The tragedy of the commons occurs when there is uninhibited access to
a communal resource. Some users begin to take more than their fair share of
that resource, which in turn encourages others to take more than their fair
share as well. 160 This leads to unsustainable resource consumption to the
point of depletion. 161 “As long as users show restraint the resource is
maintained.”162
An idea that is closely related to the tragedy of the commons is a common
pool resource. A common pool resource is any resource “from which it is
difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided” by nature or
produced by humans.163 A common pool resource is prone to depletion when
one’s use of the resource makes it unavailable for another person’s use. When
a common pool resource has a high value, but weak legal or institutional
constraints, users have strong incentives to take as much as they can and
deplete the overall supply available for future users.164
That is exactly what happened in the Valley. Prior appropriation,
combined with lax management of groundwater in the Valley led water users
to pump water to the full extent of their rights with little regard for other
users. This overuse combined with drought caused Colorado to fall behind
on compact deliveries in the 1960s. 165 As a last-ditch effort, Colorado
imposed water restrictions.166
This is a classic example of a common pool tragedy; individuals work to
maximize their own benefit at the expense of others. With weak constraints
in effect for some, and no constraints at all for others, well users continued
to pump away. Potentially, had all water users worked together to ration the
limited resource, then more users could have kept using the resource in the
future. However, conservation for mutual benefit is difficult to achieve.
Research has shown that “resource dilemmas are best resolved when
there is communication between group members, when a sense of group
identity or solidarity exists among group members, or when education is
160. Kennon M. Sheldon & Holly A. McGregor, Extrinsic Value Orientation and the “Tragedy of
the Commons”, 68 J. OF PERSONALITY 383, 384.
161. Id. at 383–85.
162. Id. at 384.
163. Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 493, 497
(1999).
164. Melissa K. Scanlan, Droughts, Floods, and Scarcity on a Climate-Disrupted Planet:
Understanding the Legal Challenges and Opportunities for Groundwater Sustainability, 37 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 52, 59 (2019).
165. Carswell, supra note 32.
166. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 27 (Colo. 2006).
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given regarding the long-term benefits of cooperation.”167 The Valley has
taken all of these steps and, so far, managed to avoid a complete collapse of
its groundwater resources. The Valley has avoided this tragedy because users
began to work together to conserve their groundwater, their common pool
resource.168As users became aware of the effects of their actions on others,
some began to recognize that if they all wanted to continue to pump water,
they would have to work together and impose limits on everyone in order for
everyone to continue pumping, albeit at a lower rate.169
These self-governance efforts are not enough without enforcement
power to actually shut off and limit pumping. There are lots of reasons for
farmers in the Valley to only look out for themselves and there are lots of
economic incentives to do so as well. Small farmers are struggling with
expensive bills.170 Other farmers who can afford to pump are outcompeting
those who cannot.171 But the biggest problem, by far, is the weather, a factor
that no one can control. If the Valley continues to experience drought, no
amount of conservation will solve the problem.
Think of an aquifer like a bank account. When more water goes in, more
water can be taken out or in the alternative saved. When less water goes in,
less water can be taken out. If the Valley continues to have dry years, it does
not matter how little water is taken out of the aquifer because there is not
enough water going in to make up for the amount being taken out.
Ultimately, the tragedy of the commons is a behavioral issue. To work to
preserve a common resource so everyone can keep using it takes some
thought. You have to buy into the solutions, and you need to care about those
affected. In the Valley, that is not always the case. There are some who
simply do not care. They have “vowed that as long as there’s water in their
hole, they’re going to pump it.”172 Others say there is a “mindset of, ‘I can
pay for it, so it’s my neighbor’s problem.’”173 It makes no sense for others to
conserve a resource when they can see others who are not conserving it. It
undermines the whole project.
The communal mindset also suffers in the Valley due to its changing
demographics. The Valley was historically a tightly knit community. 174
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Sheldon & McGregor, supra note 160, at 384.
See also Cody et al., supra note 114, at 406.
Carswell, supra note 32; Bowlin, supra 144.
Bowlin, supra note 144.
Id.
Carswell, supra note 32.
Bowlin, supra note 144.
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Today, only about 50,000 people live in the entire area.175 Agriculture has
driven the economy for decades, often with small farms. 176 But that has
started to change. No longer is the community composed of only tightly knit
neighbors. As families sell and leave the Valley, farms are purchased and
consolidated by corporations.177 “Department of Agriculture census records
show an increase in the number of large . . . farms in recent decades.”178 “In
the past few years . . . three locally owned farms nearby sold, in part due to
the ever-rising pumping fee, with most of the land going to out-of-state
investment firms.”179 For farms and companies with a smaller stake in taking
care of the Valley, it is not a life-or-death matter if they cannot continue
farming and living in the area. These large corporate farms do not care as
much about the community nor conserving its resources.
This brings up the second reason why the Valley is turning into a tragedy
of the commons—economics. In order to stave off a tragedy of the commons,
everyone must take a cut so everyone can still prosper. This does not work
when some farms cannot survive, even with a small cut or when there are
those who can afford to pay more for the resource.
As mentioned earlier, the Valley was historically a tight-knit community
made up of small farms. 180 These small farms operate on tight financial
budgets.181 In order to simply survive, these small farms will pump as much
groundwater as they legally can. They will not able to survive otherwise. This
problem is exacerbated in wetter years. When there is enough water to go
around, farms will choose to plant more water-intensive crops like alfalfa and
barley because these water-intensive crops are more lucrative than other
crops. 182 This means in wetter years, short term farming economics
incentivize more water use instead of conservation, which might restore
groundwater reserves.
In drier years, the Valley has tried to conserve groundwater by increasing
the price farmers pay per gallon when pumping groundwater. 183
Unfortunately, this also has unintended consequences. Increasing the price
of groundwater favors senior water right holders and large corporate farms.
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Blankenbuehler, supra note 34.
Bowlin, supra note 144 (“The San Luis Valley depends on agriculture.”).
Id.
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Id.
Bowlin, supra note 144.
Id.
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Increasing the price to pump groundwater favors senior water rights by
working in combination with another water conserving tool: a credit. 184
Under this credit system, “those with excess water can sell it to those who
want more.”185 This favors senior water rights because in wetter years, they
can either use that water to grow the lucrative water-intensive crops such as
alfalfa or barley, or in drier years they can sell that water.186 Either way,
senior water users profit at the expense of junior users.
However, senior water users do not always profit from this scheme.
Some senior water users have seen their crops suffer as large commercial
farms around them take advantage of the credit system.187 The credit system
only allows permitted groundwater to be drawn out of the system. It doesn’t
allow more water to be drawn out than that. Thus, it shouldn’t matter if a
senior or junior user draws that water because they have a right to do so.
Yet, due to the complexities of hydrology, depending on where the water
is physically pumped from, it can lower the water table for other water users,
preventing them from being able to use their water rights.188 So, in some
cases, a large farm will buy credits with the effect that a neighboring senior
rights holder will be unable to pump their share of water.189
It is also hard for the Valley to conserve water by increasing the price of
water because smaller farms, with tighter operating budgets, struggle to
afford these higher water prices.190 Larger farms can.
This has potential to create a vicious feedback loop where smaller farms
cannot compete with larger farms, and the smaller farms are forced out of
business.191 This in turn could free up more water for larger corporate farms.
These large farms are not as invested in the Valley, and do not always
subscribe towards the communal view necessary to save groundwater in the
Valley. Some farmers also argue that the price set for water is artificially

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. This is a phenomenon is known as the groundwater cone of depression. Groundwater and
Wells:
Understanding
Groundwater,
O R.
STATE
UNIV.,
https://wellwater.oregonstate.edu/groundwater/understanding-groundwater/groundwater-and-wells (last
visited Jan. 29, 2022).
189. E.g., Carswell, supra note 32 (“Plus, the North Star wells and others have for years slowly
strained the supply of creek water and lowered the water table.”).
190. Bowlin, supra note 144.
191. Id.
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low.192 Farmers are still paying less for pumped water than they would for
imported water.193 This is part of what encourages large commercial farms.
Another economic issue facing the Valley is that of water exportation.
The Valley has long been eyed by front-range developers for its water.194 For
smaller farms, if the price paid for exported water is high enough, it could be
hard to say no. While not many in the Valley support exporting water, some
may have no choice.
Finally, another incentive Subdistrict 1 has tried to implement is paying
farmers to fallow fields instead of planting crops. 195 This only works if
fallowing is more than, or at least as profitable as, farming. That is not always
the case.
In years where commodity prices are higher than what Subdistrict 1 can
pay to fallow fields, the high prices make conserving water hard because it
is not economically worth it.196 For one farmer, “[t]he $96,000 payment from
Sub-district 1 for fallowing a quarter of his total acreage was at most a third
of what the Coors beer company would have paid for a rotational barley
crop.”197
2012 was the first year the Valley paid farmers in Subdistrict 1 to fallow
fields.198 The goal is to ultimately fallow 40,000 acres by 2021.199 In 2012,
8,300 acres were fallowed through contracts with Subdistrict 1. 200 While
“another 15,000 to 20,000 acres were rested through private insurance that
pays farmers not to plant during droughts,” the private program does not
promote the long-term fallowing that Subdistrict 1 seeks to achieve. 201
“10,000 acres were fallowed by 2016.”202 2020 saw the highest participation
in the fallow program yet with an additional 13,000 acres enrolled.203 But that
is still short of the 40,000-acre goal.
The Valley is not simply fighting against economics. Economics can be
figured out. The weather is the biggest challenge facing the Valley’s
192. Carswell, supra note 32.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Paddock, supra note 44, at 310.
196. Carswell, supra note 32.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Blankenbuehler, supra note 34.
203. Caitlin Coleman, Wells at Risk as State Shortens Deadline to Repair Rio Grande River, THE
FENCE POST (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.thefencepost.com/news/hundreds-of-san-luis-valley-farmwells-at-risk-as-state-shortens-deadline-to-repair-rio-grande-river/.
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groundwater and conservation efforts—it threatens to pull out the rug from
underneath all the residents’ efforts is the weather. Despite residents’ efforts,
no progress has been made on restoring the aquifer, and aquifer levels have
declined.204 “Between July 2019 and July 2020 the [V]alley’s unconfined
aquifer . . . dropped by 112,600 acre-feet. All told, the aquifer has lost around
1 million acre-feet of water since the drought of 2002.”205
2018 was an incredibly dry year. “The U.S. Department of Agriculture
designated the valley a drought disaster area.”206 Because the Valley was so
dry that year, farmers pumped so much groundwater they wiped out the gains
and replacements they had put into the aquifer in previous years.207 In other
years when the Valley has been dry, the aquifer has lost more water than it
has gained.208 Even when wet years are interspersed with dry ones, the wet
years do not help the aquifer.209 Due to the economic situations mentioned
previously, when there are wet years, the Valley has not been able to make
gains on restoration because everyone uses the extra water.210
Furthermore, even if users were able to conserve extra water, the Valley
cannot rely on wet years to restore the aquifer. The southwest is experiencing
a general drying and warming trend.211 Dry and warm could possibly become
the new normal. If that is the future, what is the Valley to do?
Combining economics with behavior and the climate makes for a potent
combination. The combination makes conserving groundwater in the Valley
particularly challenging. From the behavioral side, all these efforts to
conserve water can seem in vain when the weather does not cooperate, and
not everyone participates in efforts to conserve the resource.
This creates a death spiral of sorts. As efforts appear futile, more and
more subdistrict participants might choose not to follow the rules. Or,
participants not yet in subdistricts may decide not to form one at all. Valley
residents are legally obligated to participate in a subdistrict, fallow their
fields, or develop an aug plan, which requires well users to replace the water
they consume.212 Yet without enforcement, residents are not easily made to
participate in these options.
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As more users choose not to participate in conservation, it begins to seem
pointless. This, in turn, makes it harder to conserve the resource because
fewer and fewer users are helping.
While a total lack of participation has not happened yet, if the drought
becomes worse and agriculture becomes less profitable, it is entirely possible
to achieve full participation. For many Valley residents, the reason they keep
up the thankless work of trying to use less water is because of their love for
the community, area, and farming. 213 It is hard to predict when or if the
breaking point of that love will come.
Given the challenges that the Valley is facing, some might ask why
bother? Especially given the realities of climate change, why not give up
farming in the Valley entirely? In response, people in the Valley say their
lives and livelihoods are worth just as much as anyone else.214 “People who
live here aren’t any more special than people anywhere else . . . but they also
aren’t any less special than anyone else.”215
The people in the Valley are afraid of a complete well shut off.216 A
complete well shut off will ruin lives.217 In 2020, the Colorado State Engineer
said, “we’ll see in the next couple of years if we can turn around this trick.”218
Given how dry the winter of 2021 has been, the threat seems imminent.219
While residents of the Valley knew this threat was always looming in the
background, greater institutional accountability was needed to prevent it. An
example would be mandatory water restrictions. The subdistricts had a lot of
potential to solve water issues in the Valley. However, considering climate
change, they needed something more—they needed enforcement authority.
No one wants to be the person who says no. No one wants to be the one
to say “enough.” While the people of the Valley thought voluntary and
market measures would be enough to conserve their groundwater, they have
not been. Economics, behavior, and the weather have proved them wrong.220
Unfortunately, someone or something has to step in at some point and stop
or limit groundwater pumping. That someone might be the Colorado State
Engineer in the next couple of years. But it could have been Subdistrict 1 if
it had been granted enforcement authority.
213. See Bowlin, supra note 144 (detailing interviews with community members about their love
of agriculture and the community).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Hundreds of Farm Wells at Risk, supra note 140.
219. Bollinger & Freeman, supra note 5.
220. Bowlin, supra note 144.
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Either way, greater institutional accountability is required in order to
conserve groundwater resources in the future. The Valley has proven that
voluntary conservation efforts are not enough. Climate change is hard on
farmers and businesses whose work depends on water use. People have to
make a living and survive somehow. No one likes to address consequences,
but a line must be drawn if we want to conserve a resource. Otherwise, there
will always be those who will try to maximize the resource to the fullest
extent possible.
Unfortunately, if institutions continue to follow the current law in the
Valley, senior users will be prioritized over junior users. That means plenty
of users will suffer. It is possible the Valley’s attempts to conserve
groundwater could still work if the Valley could make decisions on its own
and enforce that. However, it may be too late to find out.
III. PART III
Greater institutional accountability is required to manage groundwater,
regardless of what is known or unknown about the hydrology of certain
groundwater resources. The lack of information regarding the future of
climate change is often used as an excuse for inaction. The unknowns and
fear of reprisal paralyze decision makers. This section will argue that
decision makers in the Valley cannot wait for more scientific knowledge to
decide how to conserve their resources. If decision makers continue to wait,
it may be too late to rescue groundwater in the Valley.
In a place like the Valley and in general, waiting for more science in
order to make a decision is no longer an option. As discussed earlier, the
climate of the Valley is already changing. The changing climate is part of the
megadrought gripping the Southwest.221
No one knows for certain what will happen to the Southwest climate as
our climate changes. However, scientists already know “[s]treamflow totals
in . . . the Rio Grande . . . were 5% to 37% lower between 2001 and 2010
than the 20th century average flows.”222 Parts of Colorado are already 3.6°F
warmer than they were a century ago.223
While it may be harder to argue against the science of climate change,
some might also point to the hydrology of the Valley and reliability of the
221. Freedman & Fears, supra note 6.
222. Southwest,
NAT’L
CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT,
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southwest (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
223. Mufson et al., 2°C: Beyond the Limit, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/climate-environment/climate-change-america/.
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RGDSS Groundwater Model as a reason for inaction. The RGDSS
Groundwater Model is the Rio Grande Decision Support System.224 Decision
Support Systems are computer based systems that use data and computer
models to help decision makers solve unstructured problems. Colorado has
developed a decision support system for every major water basin in the
state.225
The hydrology of the Valley is complex.226 Initial hydrologic studies of
the Valley during the 1960s and 1970s.227 These studies were conducted in
order to implement the 1969 Act.228 The passage of HB 98-1011 mandated
the most recent research into understanding the hydrology of the Valley,
spurring the creation of RGDSS Groundwater Model.229
HB 98-1011 was passed in 1998 after efforts to export water out of the
Valley. 230 “[W]ater users in the Valley sought help from the State of
Colorado to undertake the scientific investigations needed to determine if and
how further groundwater development could occur in the Valley without
injury to vested water rights or interference with the state’s obligations under
the Compact.” 231 Much was unknown about the confined aquifer, “its
hydrologic connections to the overlying unconfined aquifer and surface
waters (including the Rio Grande), [or] its sources of recharge and their
interannual variability.”232
In 2004 the RGDSS Groundwater Model was challenged as unreliable
and inadequate.233 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this challenge and
new data continues to improve RGDSS Groundwater Model.234 However,
without regular and continuous updates to the Model, “the Model will cease
to be reliable and can no longer serve as a reasonable basis for groundwater
administration in the San Luis Valley.”235
224. Paddock, supra note 44, at 294.
225. About Us, COLORADO’S DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, https://cdss.colorado.gov/about-us (last
visited Jan. 29, 2022).
226. Id. at 250; Cody et al., supra note 114, at 407.
227. See generally P.A. EMERY ET AL., HYDROLOGY OF THE SAN LUIS VALLEY, SOUTHCENTRAL COLORADO, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR GEOLOGICAL SURV. (1969) (providing a study report
from 1969); See P.A. EMERY ET AL., HYDROLOGY OF THE SAN LUIS VALLEY IN SOUTH-CENTRAL
COLORADO: HYDROLOGIC INVESTIGATIONS ATLAS HA-381, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (1971)
(geological survey).
228. Paddock, supra note 44, at 292.
229. Id. at 294.
230. Id. at 293.
231. Id.
232. Miller et al., supra note 38, at 751.
233. Paddock, supra note 44, at 301.
234. Id. at 302.
235. Id. at 334-35.
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With the newer information provided by the RGDSS Groundwater
Model, the Valley is still trying to collect more information about the
hydrology of the area.236 A large part of this stems from the fact that the
Colorado Revised Statutes require “maintenance of artesian pressure while
allowing pressure fluctuations within the ranges that occurred during the
period of 1978 through 2000.”237 But no one knows what the pressure was
during that time period because no one was collecting that data at that time.238
To make up for the lack of historical information, the Valley hopes that new
information can fill in some of these gaps.239
Defining the standard for a sustainable aquifer water supply is also
difficult “[when there] is [a] lack of comprehensive data on the relationships
between basin scale hydrologic conditions and the resulting artesian pressure
in the confined aquifer.” 240 To achieve this goal, the Valley continues to
collect more data.241
While it is important for the Valley to continue collecting data to better
understand the hydrology of the Valley for statutory and management
reasons, a lack of a complete understanding of the hydrology of the Valley
should not be an excuse for inaction. Valley residents and the State of
Colorado recognize that changes in groundwater pumping have an effect on
surface water availability and how much water is available in the aquifer.242
So, while it may not be known precisely how much water is left in the Valley
or how exactly everything is interconnected, that is no reason to delay
enforcement or institutional accountability. The Colorado State Engineer has
said that if it ever becomes clear the Valley cannot “reach a sustainable level
by the year 2031, then, yes, . . . his office would shut off irrigation for a
substantial part of the area.”243
However, if the State Engineer waits that long, given how little is
understood about the hydrology of the Valley, then it might be too late. If
someone does not hold Valley residents accountable sooner, rather than later,
users will continue to deplete the resource. The only thing that seems to scare
Valley residents is the threat of a well shut-off.244 When subdistricts were

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 335.
COLO. REV. STAT. 37-92-501(4)(a)(III) (2019).
Paddock, supra note 44, at 335.
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Bowlin, supra note 144.
Id.
Id.
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created, the Valley thought they would be sufficient. 245 Yet, the Valley
“could not account for the realities of a changing climate, and [Subdistrict 1]
has proven unable to discourage enough farmers from pumping.”246
No one ever wants to be the one to say enough. But without greater
institutional enforcement, whether local or from the state, the aquifer cannot
be saved. By not stepping in to limit pumping earlier, the Valley, perhaps this
year, will face an even uglier reality than it already does.
CONCLUSION
Who cares if the Valley runs out of water? Who cares if the selfgovernance experiment does not work out in the Valley? Users of
groundwater across the nation, particularly in the Southwest, should care.
The Valley is a canary in the coalmine right now. Despite their best efforts,
users in the Valley have been unable to conserve enough water in the face of
climate change.
Conjunctive management is difficult. One often hears about how
groundwater resources are overtaxed,247 yet they are a resource that seems to
keep lasting beyond anyone’s expectations. The science keeps changing,
extending the expected lifespan of groundwater resources. It is unclear how
much humans can, or will, curb their behavior to conserve such resources.
But climate change is changing all that. Climate change has made it
increasingly difficult to conserve enough water.248 Voluntary measures are
not enough to conserve water in light of the challenges climate change
presents. Under the pressure of climate change, voluntary measures are not
sufficient due to a combination of behavior and economics.
When there are no mandatory water restrictions in the Valley, users are
unlikely to limit their water consumption. Some users only care about
themselves and not the community as a whole. Other users, particularly small
farms, are struggling with expensive bills. 249 Other users who can afford
higher prices are outcompeting those who cannot.250 Depending on the year,
users either cannot afford to fallow fields, or it is not economically worth it
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Lucas Bessire, The Next Disaster Coming to the Great Plains, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 26, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/12/kansas-aquifer-ogallala-water-crisisdrought/621007/; Jonathan Thompson, As Temperatures Rise, Arizona Sinks, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr.
1, 2020), https://www.hcn.org/issues/52.4/infographic-water-as-temperatures-rise-arizona-sinks.
248. Bowlin, supra note 144.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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to fallow fields.251 Currently, there is more water leaving the aquifers in the
Valley than entering them. 252 The megadrought, combined with the
economics of water pumping, has exposed flaws in the system.
Water managers, politicians, and users in the Valley are aware of this.253
Many are aware that a painful future is looming. Despite their best efforts,
they have not been able to do enough. The inability to conserve water without
the threat of a well shut-off in the Valley should serve as a lesson. The biggest
takeaway by far is that without institutional accountability, other efforts will
not be enough to conserve groundwater.
Water users in the Valley are human. But, as demonstrated earlier, they
will not stop pumping water until forced.254 People need someone to come in
and enforce limits on water. Otherwise, as the Valley has shown us, even in
the face of a dire future, economics and human behavior will always keep
some users pumping water to the detriment of others. 255 Enforcement of
mandatory measures, such as limits or restrictions, is the only way forward
to conserve groundwater in the face of climate change.

251. Carswell, supra note 32.
252. Bowlin, supra note 144 (infographic).
253. Bowlin, supra note 144.
254. See supra Part II (discussing ineffectiveness of self-governance measures without enforcement
power).
255. Jane Braxton Little, The Ogallala Aquifer: Saving a Vital U.S. Water Source, SCI. AM. (Mar.
1, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-ogallala-aquifer/.

